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Abstract
In the late 1990s, the Canadian newspaper industry underwent
rapid consolidation with a few conglomerates controlling the vast ma-
jority of daily papers. Over a 4 year period, about three-fourths of
Canada’s daily newspapers changed ownership. While the issue re-
ceived considerable attention and criticism at the time, the concerns
were mostly about diversity of opinion. We have not found any study
examining the straightforward economic implications of such a large
scale realignment in this important industry.
We examine the effect of this consolidation on observable variables
relating to consumer welfare. Specifically, we analyze prices for both
circulation and advertising, as well as study the extent to which con-
centration increased using county level circulation data. Our results do
not support the notion that greater concentration led to the abuse of
market power in the form of higher prices. In fact, our results suggest
that newspapers with changed ownership and those in the dominant
chains had either lower price increases or greater price declines after
the merger, compared with the other papers.
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Les anne´es 1990 correspondent a` une pe´riode de consolidation rapide
de l’industrie de la presse e´crite au Canada. Entre 1995 et 1998,
les trois-quarts des quotidiens ont change´ de main. Cette consolida-
tion a rec¸u une large couverture me´diatique et relance´ le de´bat sur
l’importance de la diversite´ e´ditoriale dans la presse canadienne. Nous
quantifions l’impact e´conomique de ce re´alignement. Nous examinons
l’effet de cette consolidation sur des variables observables relie´es au
surplus des consommateurs. En particulier, nous faisons l’analyse du
prix de vente aux lecteurs ainsi que des couˆts pour les annonceurs.
De plus nous mesurons a` quel point la concentration a augmente´ en
utilisant des donne´es sur la circulation des quotidiens dans comte´ au
pays. Nos re´sultats ne supportent pas l’assertion que l’augmentation
de la concentration dans la presse canadienne a mene´ a` un abus du
pouvoir de marche´ de la part des quotidiens. Au contraire, nous trou-
vons que les quotidiens qui ont change´ de proprie´taire ainsi que ceux
posse´de´s par un des groupes de presse dominants ont vu des augmen-
tations de prix moins e´leve´s ou des baisses de prix plus fortes apre`s les
fusions par rapport aux autres journaux.
JEL Code: L82, L41.
1 Introduction
The issue of media ownership concentration is an especially delicate one
because of concerns over the accurate dissemination of information to con-
sumers and the need to allow room for differing opinions in television, radio
and the print media. There appears to be a growing trend towards consolida-
tion in all segments of media markets- the radio industry in North America,
for example, is dominated by the huge market power of Clear Channel Com-
munications. Network television in the US is controlled by just 4 groups,
whose parent companies (Viacom, for instance) control significant shares of
the cable television market as well. Internationally, Rupert Murdoch’s News
Corporation has controlling stakes in newspapers, television stations, record
companies and magazines in the US, UK, Australia, Canada and across Asia.
More recently, the trend toward cross-media collaborations and acquisitions
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has resulted in the creation of AOL Time Warner, with the combined reach
of CNN, Time Magazine, AOL, Warner Bros. among others.
The issue of media concentration recently received widespread attention
in the United States with the proposal in 2003 by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to relax ownership and cross-ownership laws in the media:
raising the market cap on the reach of television stations owned by the same
conglomerate, and allowing firms to own print and broadcast media in the
same market. After considerable criticism and debate in the media, the idea
appears to have been dropped.
There are two possible effects of an increase in consolidation that can
cause concern- the potential for an abuse of market power by firms (the usual
economic concern from large mergers) and the potential for reduced diversity
of opinions and content from having fewer media sources. In this paper we
examine the first of these issues. As we describe in the next section, the
Canadian newspaper market experienced huge changes through a number
of acquisitions in a surprisingly short time. Our goal is to examine whether
these mergers led to price changes or had observable effects on newspaper
readership. In Canada, unlike in the United States, there are no special
protections accorded to print media which would stop a merger in order to
prevent a loss of diversity of editorial opinion. Thus, only strictly economic
arguments could have been used to prevent the newspaper mergers in the
late 1990’s. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 3.
The Canadian newspaper mergers can be traced to three large business
acquisitions between 1996 and 2000:
•Through a series of deals in 1995 and 1996, Hollinger Inc. acquired a
controlling stake1 in the Southam group of newspapers (which included 16
daily newspapers) as well as completed the purchase of 25 daily newspapers
from the Thomson group and 7 independent dailies.2
•On March 1st, 1999, Quebecor Inc. acquired the Sun Media chain of
newspapers, including 14 daily papers, in a $983 million deal. Quebecor
1“Hollinger takes control of Southam: Black leading press baron”, The Gazette, May
25, 1996.
2“Newspapers Are Reshuﬄed Across Canada”, The New York Times, May 13, 1996.
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surpassed a bid by Torstar for purchasing Sun Media, but in turn sold four
of its existing dailies to Torstar.3
•On July 31st, 2000, Canwest purchased 28 daily newspapers from Hollinger
Inc. The $3.5 billion purchase constituted the largest media deal in Canada’s
history. It allowed Canwest to go from having a zero stake in the Canadian
newspaper market to becoming the country’s biggest publisher, with 1.8
million daily readers.4
Unsurprisingly, the scale and speed of consolidation in the Canadian
daily newspaper market led to considerable debate and criticism. However,
much of the debate centered around the issue of editorial independence and
the possible lack of diversity of opinion resulting from a handful of me-
dia conglomerates dominating the popular press, as well as the possibility
that the new owners would not represent the interests of local communities.
There was relatively little debate about the economic effects of the merg-
ers or standard economic concerns relating to rapid consolidation in any
industry.
In fact we have not found any academic work studying the economic ef-
fects of the mergers; this is especially surprising for an industry that reaches
79% of adult Canadians every week and generates annual revenues of 3.3
Billion Canadian Dollars (about 2.9 Billion US Dollars).5 In our paper we
attempt to fill this gap by examining whether the mergers affected prices
or consumer welfare in the daily newspaper market. When speaking of con-
sumers, it is important to keep in mind that there are two distinct groups of
consumers in newspaper markets: readers and advertisers. We will examine
the effect of the 1990’s merger wave on reader and advertiser welfare.
Our results do not support the notion that increased concentration led
to higher prices, for either circulation prices or advertising rates. In par-
ticular, newspapers with changed ownership saw smaller price increases, or
3“It’s Official: Sun Now Quebecor’s”, The Toronto Sun, March 2, 1999.
4“New news empire is born: CanWest Global picks up dailies from Hollinger for $3.5
billion.” The Gazette, August 1, 2000.
5Figures are from the Canadian Newspaper Association and include totals for both
daily and weekly newspapers. Revenue figures are the sum of advertising and circulation
revenues.
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greater price declines than newspapers with unchanged ownership. Addi-
tionally, newspapers in the two dominant chains (Hollinger and Quebecor in
1999, and Canwest and Quebecor in 2002) did not have significantly differ-
ent price changes from the remaining newspapers. For example, we find that
circulation prices at newspapers in the dominant chains rose by an average
of between 11 and 14 cents, which was a smaller increase than the corre-
sponding increase of around 15 cents for independent newspapers or those in
smaller chains. Moreover, average advertising prices decreased by 12 cents
per 1000 readers at newspapers in the Hollinger and Quebecor chains, com-
pared with a corresponding rise of 8 cents in the remaining papers. Our
results are robust to examining different lengths of time after the mergers;
they also do not show a strong relation between local concentration (as indi-
cated by county level data) and higher prices. These results are reassuring
from the point of view of consumer surplus in that there is no clear eco-
nomic effect of increased market power. Thus the Competition Bureau was
correct in permitting these mergers since they did lead to abuse of market
power in the form of higher prices for either readers or advertisers. Later in
the paper we offer reasons for why prices did not rise despite much greater
concentration.
These results do not provide a causal effect of these mergers since the set
of newspapers changing hands is not exogenous. This is because the set of
mergers which were consummated in the 1990’s were the outcome of both the
choices of firms and approval by Canada’s Competition Bureau. However,
the Competition Bureau never chooses which firms will merge since this is
the perogative of the firms. Thus for an agency such as the Competition
Bureau the correct “experiment” to evaluate the efficacy of merger policy is
to vary the set of mergers which are approved,conditional on firms proposing
them.
There is a substantial literature which evaluates the effects of proposed
mergers on consumer prices such as the recent work by Nevo (2000). The
norm in this research is to use a structural model of demand and firm con-
duct and assume that the merger will change the ownership patterns in
the industry, but will not alter the type of equilibrium firms play (such as
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allowing the possibility of tacit collusion) or change the preferences of in-
dividuals. In contrast, our difference in difference approach can allow for a
broader class of effects such as a consumer boycott of merged papers. 6
Our paper adds to a vast body of work on media markets, but to a
relatively small literature on the effects of concentration in these markets.7
Most closely related to our work is George (2001), who studies the effect of
ownership concentration on product variety. She finds that product differ-
entiation among newspapers, as measured by the variety of topics covered,
actually increases with ownership concentration. She also finds that the
additional variety increases readership. The first result is hardly surprising
from a theoretical standpoint; multi-product firms internalize the business
stealing effect, and therefore the effect of mergers, or ownership concentra-
tion, should be for owners to reposition their products so as to appeal to
new and distinct groups of readers. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) find similar
results in the radio industry; their results suggest that consolidation in ra-
dio markets, caused by the US Telecommunications Act of 1996, increased
product variety.
Chandra (2006) argues that advertising prices should not be affected by
the degree of concentration in newspaper markets, as long as there is little or
no overlap among newspaper readers. This may explain some of the results
in this paper; specifically, our finding that per-reader advertising rates do
not increase in newspapers with greater market power.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the
data used for the project. In Section 3 we provide the historical background
pertaining to the newspaper merger wave. In Section 4 we provide detailed
results showing the effect that the mergers had on observable characteristics
of the industry. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
6Recent work has evaluated the forecasts of structural merger models by comparing
them to changes in prices which followed the merger. Peters (2006) and Weinberg (2006)
find these structural models have mediocre performance in predicting the effect of airline
and motor oil mergers.
7For references on studies of the newspaper industry, see Chandra (2006).
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2 Data
We use data from three sources.8 Editor & Publisher Magazine – which is
the weekly magazine of the newspaper industry – is our source of informa-
tion on newspaper prices, advertising rates, aggregate circulation, and other
newspaper characteristics (such as the number of employees of the newspa-
per publisher and the number of pages per copy) for every daily newspaper
in Canada. We have collected these data for the years 1995, 1996, 1998,
1999 and 2002. There are, on average 101 daily newspapers in each year,
with a small amount of entry.9
Summary Statistics at the aggregate level are in Table 1; this contains
all daily newspapers in Canada. Note that an observation in this table is a
newspaper-year combination, we have data for the 5 years listed above. The
data show that, during our sample period, the mean weekday newspaper
circulation was 47206 and the median circulation was 18019. While it may
appear that circulation on Saturdays and Sundays is considerably higher
than on weekdays, it is important to keep in mind that not all newspapers
publish on one or both days of the weekend, and those that do tend to be the
larger circulating ones. Conditional on having a Saturday edition, average
daily circulation is over 56,000 copies, and conditional on having a Sunday
edition, average daily circulation is over 98,000.10 The mean circulation
price is $0.58 and the mean advertising price per column inch is $2.3 on
weekdays. Just over half the newspapers in the sample are published in the
evening, while 11% are French language papers.11
A supplementary source of data is obtained from county level circula-
tion figures provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC). ABC is
8We have made (most) of our data available online so that it is available
to other researchers. We have exlcuded the proprietary data that was pur-
chased from ABC. The dataset and variable descriptions can be accessed at:
http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/chandra/canadadata.html
9For example, during this period the Lloydminster Times became a daily paper (from
a weekly paper), and the National Post was founded.
10Among those newspapers that publish an edition every day of the week, Saturday
circulation is the highest, followed by Sunday circulation.
11Of the 11 French papers, there are 9 in Quebec, and 1 each in New Brunswick and
Ontario.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Weekday Circ. 515 47206 74041 1000 494719
Saturday Circ. 408 68366 106508 2675 739108
Sunday Circ. 139 110750 112708 13693 491105
Average Price ($) 515 0.58 0.15 0.21 1.04
Average Pages 491 39.7 26.3 8 140
Weekday Ad. Rate ($) 511 2.3 3.0 0.4 25.6
Saturday Ad. Rate 399 2.9 3.7 0.5 26.9
Sunday Ad. Rate 137 4.0 2.7 1.0 12.5
Evening Paper 515 0.52 0.50 0 1
French 515 0.11 0.31 0 1
Ad. Rate per 10K readers 511 0.98 0.86 0.22 7.70
Source: Editor and Publisher Magazine.
Table 1: Aggregate Summary Statistics
an independent, not-for-profit organization that is widely recognized as the
leading auditor of periodical information in North America and many other
countries. Potential advertisers in the print media use the circulation data
provided by ABC as the basis for determining where to allocate their adver-
tising dollars. The ABC dataset contains extremely detailed information on
the circulation of 73 Canadian newspapers for the years 1995-1999. These
73 newspapers constitute the major selling dailies in Canada,12 and the
only ones on which ABC collects information. We have also matched to
each county detailed demographic data: median income, education distri-
bution, population and languages spoken. Specifically, we use the Statistics
Canada County Demographic data set for the 1996 Census Year. For each
newspaper, we know the counties in which it circulates and the number of
copies sold (weekday and Sunday separately). Using this dataset, we are
able to determine exactly which newspapers compete with each other and
how intense that competition is. Relying simply on aggregate data would
12Along with the Globe and Mail as discussed below.
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not allow us to make these distinctions. In fact, ABC provided these data
at the postal code level for a subset of newspapers but in order to have
comparable observations across papers we have aggregated the postal code
level data to the county level.13 Conceptually, it would seem that merging
these two geographies would lead to the loss of a great deal of data. How-
ever, since virtually all postal codes are completely contained within a single
county, we can aggregate postal code data to the county level.14 To do this
we take Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion File for 1996 (PCCF)
which lists the county to which a 6 character postal code belongs. Next, we
create a match from 3 digit postal codes to counties. 3 digit postal codes
are also known as Forward Sortation Areas or FSAs; for example the FSA
for K1A 0G2 is K1A. The match from FSAs to counties is done by taking
the median county of all 6 digit postal codes within an FSA. Finally, we
aggregate all FSAs in the same county to create county level statistics.
Table 2 has summary statistics at the county level; observations in the
first panel are newspaper-county combinations. The average weekday cir-
culation is 4638 per newspaper per county. We also present measures of
the Herfindahl index calculated according to county level market shares in
weekday circulation. These measures are defined in section 4. Essentially,
we compute the herfindahl index in each county and then, for each newspa-
per or chain of newspapers, weight the value of the herfindahl index in the
counties in which it is present by its circulation in that county. This pro-
vides an indicator of the competitive environment faced by newspapers or
chains, by giving more importance to markets where the newspaper/chain
has a greater fraction of its circulation. The mean weighted herfindahl index
by newspapers is 0.55; the mean weighted index by chain is 0.61.
Panel 2 of Table 4 provides aggregate circulation figures at the county
level as well as demographic data on population and income. Total weekday
13The level of detail at which circulation data are collected differs usually due to the size
of the newspapers. For papers with very high circulation, providing and auditing accurate
figures at the postal code level is extremely hard, which is why the data are sometimes
only available at the county level.
14In fact more than 98% of postal codes within a forward sortation area (FSA) are in a
single county.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Newspaper-Counties:
Weekday Circ. 3612 4638 16020 1 220930
Saturday Circ. 2007 4719 19020 3 305227
Sunday Circ. 2789 4233 16134 0 188326
Weekly Circulation 3612 31446 108994 9 1598203
Weighted Herfindahl 3612 0.55 0.16 0.33 1
(Individual Paper)
Weighted Herfindahl 3612 0.61 0.19 0.34 1
(Group)
Counties:
Total Daily Circ. 1053 15909 38366 1 324940
Total Weekly Circ. 1053 107880 262910 62 2353779
Population (15 plus) 257 87590 201999 5680 1959935
Average Income 257 22352 3504 15548 35555
Median Income 257 17046 3108 10211 27136
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) and Statistics Canada.
Table 2: County level summary statistics
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circulation in the average county is 15909. We have observations on 1053
counties pooled across the four years of available data; this translates to
observations on approximately 260 counties annually. The demographic data
reveal a wide variation in county definitions across the country: the mean
county population (15 years and older) is approximately 87,000; however
some counties have populations of well over a million.15
While it is the case that we do not have county level circulation data for a
subset of Canadian dailies, as a practical matter there is no straightforward
solution to this problem, since ABC simply does not collect or provide data
for the 28 newspapers for which we only have aggregate circulation figures.
In the county level analysis that follows, we will restrict our attention to
the newspapers for which we do have county level data. For the most part,
with one major exception, the 28 newspapers without county data are low
circulating, small-town newspapers. The one exception is the Globe and
Mail, at the time Canada’s only national newspaper and the second largest
newspaper in the country with an average daily circulation of over 300,000.16
ABC does not collect county level circulation data for the Globe and Mail,
but we were able to obtain circulation figures at the CMA level for this
newspaper.17 We analyze circulation figures specifically for the Globe and
Mail in Section 4.3; for the present, we note that the Globe and Mail was not
affected by the newspaper mergers; in fact, its circulation remained quite
stable across each province over the period of our study.
We argue that the remaining newspapers for which we do not have county
level data will not affect our results significantly. The average weekday cir-
culation of all daily newspapers during our study period is approximately
46,000 while the median is approximately 18,000. By contrast, 18 of the
27 omitted newspapers have a daily circulation of less than 10,000. Of the
15There are 3 such counties; they include substantial portions of the metropolitan areas
of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, respectively.
16The largest circulating newspaper was, and remains, The Toronto Star . Its circulation
was approximately 465,000 over the study period; however it was almost entirely confined
to Ontario.
17CMAs (Census Metropolitan Areas) are geographic areas comprising an urban core
of at least 100,000 plus the surrounding urban areas.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Newspapers per County 3.4 1.6 1 13 3
Counties per Newspaper 12.3 17.0 1 92 5
Table 3: Dispersion of Newspapers across Counties
remainder, the largest are the Kingston Whig-Standard and the Peterbor-
ough Examiner with approximate daily circulations of 27,000 and 22,000
respectively. We will proceed with the county level analysis under the as-
sumption that the omitted newspapers did not see major changes in their
circulation at the county level, controlling for changes in aggregate circula-
tion; in essence, we will take their county level circulation and market shares
as given, and examine those newspapers on which we do have data. This
method does allow us to say more on this subject than if we were to restrict
ourselves only to the (complete) aggregate data.
Finally, in Table 3, we provide figures on the spread of newspapers across
counties. The mean and median number of daily newspapers per county are
respectively 3.4 and 3. The mean and median number of counties across
which a newspaper circulates are respectively 12.3 and 5.
3 Background on the Canadian Mergers
In this section we provide some historical background on the wave of newspa-
per mergers in Canada in the late 1990s and also present aggregate statistics
detailing the extent of consolidation in the industry.
The 1990s saw a wave of consolidation in the Canadian Newspaper in-
dustry, spurred by Hollinger’s entry into the Canadian Newspaper market
in 1994. Through several acquisitions, by 1998 Hollinger controlled a large
fraction of the Canadian Newspaper market. Table 4 shows that the market
share of the top 3 newspapers chains in Canada rose from 56% to 78% from
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1995 to 1999 with Hollinger’s share rising from 0 to 44%.
By 2002, the 3-firm concentration ratio was back down to 67%.. Note
that over this time, aggregate newspaper circulation in Canada had been
steadily declining. The 1995-1996 merger wave is a particularly interesting
case study of the effects of media concentration for several reasons. In most
western countries, media industries are subject to more stringent restrictions
on mergers and concentration than are other industries. For instance, in
the United States, the Federal Communications Commission is entrusted
with regulating the communications and media sectors. In contrast, Canada
does not have specific legislation regarding competition in media. Instead
the Competition Bureau regulates newspapers as it does any other product
market:
As the Toronto Star editorialized:
“Canada is alone among industrialized nations in having no laws
to limit press and broadcast concentration; most countries have
strict limits on either the percentage of national audience al-
lowed one company, the number of newspapers or broadcasting
stations one company can own, the impact of a proposed merger
on editorial diversity, or a combination of all of these.”18
Even Canada’s Competition Bureau acknowledges this fact:
“As a law of general application that covers all businesses in
Canada, the Competition Act has no specific provisions regard-
ing broadcasting, telecommunications, newspapers or other me-
dia. Also, the Competition Act is essentially an economic law.
When it is applied to specific cases, an analytical framework
common to all products and services is employed.”19
Thus the issue of insuring diversity in media is substantially sidestepped
by Canadian Competition law. This legal arrangement allowed for the un-
precedented wave of consolidation in the Canadian newspaper industry in
18“Media concentration is at crisis levels”, The Toronto Star, May 2, 1997.
19“The Competition Bureau’s Work in Media Industries: Background for the Senate
Committee on Transport and Communications” Competition Bureau, page 6.
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Ownership Daily Circulation National Market
Share
1995
Southam 1285746 0.26
Thomson 997425 0.20
Torstar 494719 0.10
Sun Media 472054 0.09
Quebecor 421841 0.08
Trans Canada (JTC) 283472 0.06
Others 1058793 0.21
Aggregate National Circulation 5014050
1999
Hollinger/Southam 2211945 0.44
Quebecor/Sun Media 1160572 0.23
Thomson 536346 0.11
Torstar 460654 0.09
Trans Canada (JTC) 257316 0.05
Others 345218 0.07
Aggregate National Circulation 4972051
2002
Canwest 1575936 0.33
Quebecor 973059 0.20
Torstar 671231 0.14
Trans Canada (JTC) 415345 0.09
Hollinger 259523 0.05
Others 918383 0.19
Aggregate National Circulation 4813477
Table 4: Newspaper Ownership by Group
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1995: Sun Media Southam Thomson Others/Independent Total
1999:
Hollinger/Southam 0 13 23 20 56
Quebecor 8 0 0 5 13
Thomson 0 1 0 1 2
Torstar 0 1 2 1 4
Total 8 15 25 27 75
Source: Editor and Publisher Magazine.
Table 5: Changes in Newspaper Ownership 1995 to 1999
the mid 1990’s. It is worth noting that the Canadian newspaper market
was already quite concentrated in the early 1990’s. Indeed only 9 cities in
the country at that time had more than one daily newspaper. The merger
wave affected almost all newspaper markets in Canada; between 1995 and
1999, 75 daily newspapers changed hands. Over the same period, the na-
tional Herfindahl index rose from 1600 to 2400, indicating a shift from an
industry with a moderate level of concentration to one with a high level of
concentration.
4 Results
The reallocation in the Canadian Newspaper industry as a whole is enor-
mous. Only a quarter of daily newspapers had the same owner in 1999 as
in 1995. Table 5 depicts the changes in ownership for the 75 newspapers
that changed ownership over the period 1995 to 1999; columns represent
1995 ownership and rows represent 1999 ownership. There are no entries
for some newspaper chains, for example Quebecor in 1995, because none of
Quebecor’s possessions in 1995 changed hands.
The row and column totals tell us that, for example, Thomson lost 25
papers over the 4-year period and gained 2. Hollinger was clearly the biggest
gainer with 56 acquisitions. Even if the 13 existing Southam owned papers
are not taken into account, the Hollinger/Southam chain acquired 43 news-
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papers over this period from Thomson and from independent publishers.
Quebecor acquired the largest newspaper to change hands, the Vancouver
Sun, with a daily circulation exceeding 240,000.
4.1 Price and Quantity Changes
We now present our empirical findings on the effect of the newspaper merg-
ers. Our identification strategy is a difference-in-differences approach. We
compare various groups of newspapers: those that changed hands versus
those that did not; those in the dominant newspaper chains versus the rest;
and those that competed in multi-newspaper cities versus those which op-
erated essentially as local monopolies.
Note that the mergers do not constitute a valid natural experiment, since
the newspaper chains determined which papers changed hands and which
did not. However, it is not clear that a natural experiment is useful for
a Competition Authority deciding on whether to approve a merger. The
collection of mergers that come before the Competition Authority are never
exogenous since firms initiate mergers. Moreover, mergers which are likely
to increase market power will also be more profitable for the merging firms.
Thus the fact that two firms were willing to merge indicates that they may be
able increase their market power. In this context, we present an empirical
examination of whether newspapers with greater market power exercised
that market power in the form of higher prices.
Table 6 compares characteristics of newspapers that changed hands over
the four year period of consolidation 1995-1999, to those that did not.
It appears to be the case that neither circulation nor advertising prices
at acquired newspapers experienced changes that were significantly different
from those that did not change ownership. In general, average circulation
prices rose slightly and average advertising rates fell slightly for both groups
of newspapers. The fall in advertising prices is related to slight declines in
circulation for both groups of newspapers over this period. Upon examining
advertising prices per 10,000 readers (i.e. normalizing by circulation), it
appears that advertising rates per reader decreased for newspapers with
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Unchanged Changed Diff-in-Diff
Ownership Ownership
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.02
Weekday Circ. -5952 8525 -2932 4075 3020 1736
Ad rate -0.13 0.94 -0.43 0.67 -0.30 0.20
Av Pages 0.50 7.07 -0.57 5.41 -1.07 1.52
Ad rate per 10K 0.08 0.38 -0.12 0.30 -0.19 0.08
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.09 0.00 0.02
N 26 75
Table 6: Difference in Differences estimates for newspapers with changed
ownership, 1995 to 1999
new ownership, and this change is significantly different from the change for
unacquired newspapers, whose per reader advertising prices rose slightly over
the same period. We also examined whether the two groups of newspapers
had different percentage changes in circulation by looking at the difference
in the logs of daily circulation, but there was no significant difference.
In Table 7, we extend the time period of the study by looking at dif-
ferences between newspapers with changed and unchanged ownership over
the period 1995 to 2002. This allows us to examine whether the ownership
changes had a delayed effect; it also allows us to examine the effect of the
Canwest takeovers of 2000. The results of Table 6 continue to hold; it is not
the case that newly acquired newspapers had significantly different changes
in either of the two prices as compared to newspapers with unchanged own-
ership.20 However the results do indicate that the newspapers with new
ownership had significantly greater percent declines in circulation compared
with newspapers that retained their ownership. It is surprising, though,
that this change appears a few years following the takeovers, rather than
immediately following them.
20There are fewer observations with changed ownership in 2002 than in 1999. This
is because we classify newspaper ownership only according to the 7 groups defined in
Table 4. Some papers that were acquired by a chain in the 1996-1998 mergers reverted to
independent ownership by 2002.
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Unchanged Changed Diff-in-Diff
Ownership Ownership
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.11 -0.03 0.03
Weekday Circ. -3257 13354 -5989 13355 -2732 2907
Ad rate 0.26 1.44 -0.10 0.67 -0.36 0.27
Av Pages -2.13 12.71 0.48 5.97 2.61 2.43
Ad rate per 10K 0.13 0.49 0.08 0.56 -0.05 0.11
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.13 -0.19 0.29 -0.09 0.04
N 30 71
Table 7: Difference in Differences estimates for newspapers with changed
ownership, 1995 to 2002
In Tables 8 and 9, we examine whether newspapers that were part of
the two dominant chains in 1999 and 2002, had significantly different price
changes (from their 1995 levels) than the remaining papers. The two dom-
inant chains were Hollinger and Quebecor in 1999 (controlling 67% of the
daily newspaper market) and Canwest and Quebecor in 2002 (with 53% of
the market).
Once again, there are almost no significant differences in the changes for
the two groups. The one variable that is significant (or marginally signif-
icant) is the per reader advertising price. However even in this case it is
not clear what effect the mergers had; the Hollinger and Quebecor newspa-
pers’ per reader advertising prices experienced a significantly greater price
decline than the remaining newspapers in 1999; but the Canwest and Que-
becor papers of 2002 had somewhat (though marginally significant) higher
price increases than the other papers. We also examined percent changes in
the variables of interest, rather than simply looking at the change in levels.
We do not present those results here, other than the percent changes in cir-
culation, but the results do not point to significant differences between any
of the pairs of newspaper groups.
Finally, we discuss the results using Herfindahl indices generated from
county level circulation data. As discussed above, we create weighted Herfind-
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Others Hollinger/ Diff-in-Diff
Quebecor
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.02
Weekday Circ. -5118 7949 -3141 4396 1977 1564
Ad rate -0.27 0.92 -0.39 0.69 -0.12 0.27
Av Pages -1.65 7.10 0.25 5.24 1.90 2.43
Ad rate per 10K 0.05 0.37 -0.12 0.31 -0.17 0.11
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04
N 29 72
Table 8: Difference in Differences estimates for Hollinger and Quebecor,
1995 to 1999
Others Canwest/ Diff-in-Diff
Quebecor
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.02
Weekday Circ. -3370 10338 -7933 16716 -4564 2956
Ad rate -0.03 1.03 0.07 0.88 0.10 0.19
Av Pages -1.10 8.86 1.18 7.38 2.28 1.63
Ad rate per 10K 0.01 0.44 0.21 0.65 0.20 0.12
Log Weekday Circ. -0.14 0.16 -0.19 0.35 -0.05 0.06
N 61 40
Table 9: Difference in Differences estimates for Canwest and Quebecor, 1995
to 2002
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ahl indices that, for each newspaper, weigh the standard Herfindahl index
in each county that the newspaper circulates in, by its circulation in that
county, thereby assigning greater importance to counties where the paper has
larger audiences. Therefore, as with a regular Herfindahl index, this mea-
sure ranges between 0 and 1, and the higher it is, the less the competitive
nature of a firm’s market. We use these measures to examine whether news-
papers that faced a lower level of competition from rival publishers tended
to see greater changes in their advertising or circulation prices. We distin-
guish between two types of the weighted herfindahl index: Own Weighted
Herfindahl (OWH), which calculates market shares based on the circulation
of individual newspapers, and Group Weighted Herfindahl (GWH), which
treats the publishing group as the unit of analysis in each county, though
still weighs the herfindahl by each individual paper’s circulation. That is,
for newspaper i,
OWHi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Own Weighted Herfindahl
=
∑
k
[
circik ∗
∑
j
s2jk
]
∑
k
circik
where circik is i’s circulation in county k and sjk is the market share of
newspaper j in county k. Similarly, for newspaper i,
GWHi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Group Weighted Herfindahl
=
∑
k
[
circik ∗
∑
g
s2gk
]
∑
k
circik
where sgk is the market share of group g in county k.
As can be seen from Table 2, there is significant variation across news-
papers in the values of the Herfindahl measures. The mean value of OWH
is 0.55 and of GWH is 0.61. However, these values range from 0.33 to 1. We
performed panel regressions of advertising rates per reader and circulation
prices on the two herfindahl measures and present the coefficients in Table
10. Note that since ABC makes county data available only for 73 papers, the
results are on this sample of papers and not on the full set of newspapers in
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Dependent Variable: Circulation Price
Coefficient StdErr
Own Weighted Herfindahl 0.047 0.146
Group Weighted Herfindahl -0.075 0.073
Herfindahl Interaction -0.34 0.41
Dependent Variable: Ad Rate per 10K circ.
Coefficient StdErr
Own Weighted Herfindahl 0.325 0.399
Group Weighted Herfindahl 0.059 0.198
Herfindahl Interaction -1.94 1.15
Table 10: Newspaper Fixed Effects Regression of prices on Weighted
Herfindahl Indices
the Canadian industry.21 Each regression had as regressors the Herfindahl
indices discussed above, the interaction of the two indices, and newspaper
fixed effects. The results unambiguously show no effect of the concentration
measures on circulation prices, implying that, regardless of the intensity of
competition faced by newspaper publishers, there was no effect of the merg-
ers on circulation prices. However, the regression of per reader advertising
rates on the herfindahl indices indicates that advertising prices may have
risen as a result of the mergers. While neither of the Herfindahl indices is
individually significant at the 95% level, they are jointly significant.22
We also attempted to gauge the fraction of the population that was
impacted by the ownership changes. From 1995 to 1999, 229 out of the
256 counties in our dataset experienced an ownership change for at least
2152 out of these 73 newspapers changed ownership over the period 1995-1999, which is
about the same proportion of ownership changes of the entire set of newspapers.
22We also ran the two regressions in Table 10 using either only OwnWeighted Herfindahl
or only Group Weighted Herfindahl and found that in each case the coefficient on the
Herfindahl was statistically insignificant.
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one of the newspapers circulating in the county. The total population of
these counties was approximately 97% of the national population. However,
only 58% of readers were impacted by the mergers by having their newspaper
acquire new ownership. This is due to the fact that the acquired newspapers
were, on average, smaller (average circulation of approximately 35,000) than
those that were not acquired (average circulation of approximately 75,000).
This is driven in large part by the fact that Canada’s 3 largest newspapers—
the Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, and Le Journal de Montreal—did
not change ownership over this period.
4.2 Multi-Newspaper Cities
In this section we examine whether the newspaper mergers had observable
effects on within-city competition among newspapers. Over the period of our
analysis there were 9 cities in Canada with more than one newspaper located
in the city.23 The effects of the various mergers on newspaper competition
in these cities is summarized as follows:
Alberta: In both Calgary and Edmonton, there was no effect of the
1996 mergers on the ownership structure. Both cities had one newspaper
owned by Sun Media and one owned by Southam and this remained true
until 1999. However, Quebecor’s 1999 takeover of Sun Media and Canwest’s
later acquisition of many Southam papers affected both cities: By 2002, each
city had one newspaper owned by Quebecor and the other owned by Can-
west. This did not change the value of the group herfindahl index because
they remained multi-ownership cities.
Quebec: Likewise, in Montreal there was no effect of the 1996 merg-
ers on ownership. Montreal is the only Canadian city with 4 newspapers,
3 of which had unchanged ownership (Quebecor, JTC and Independent re-
spectively) throughout the period of our study.24 However, one paper, The
23We define a newspaper as being located in a city if its primary publishing office address
is within that city.
24Part of the reason that Montreal can support 4 daily newspapers (when larger cities,
including in the United States, can usually support only 2, rarely 3) is its distinct anglo-
phone and francophone populations as well as demand for multiple papers by the signif-
icant fraction of its population that is bilingual. However, 3 of the 4 papers are French.
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Gazette, was included in Canwest’s 2000 takeover of 13 Southam newspapers.
Out of Sherbrooke’s 2 newspapers, one remained under the ownership of
JTC throughout the study period while the other, The Record, was initially
an independent paper, and briefly bought by Quebecor before being sold to
Hollinger.
British Columbia: Both of Vancouver’s daily newspapers were owned
by Southam/Hollinger until 2000 when they were both bought by Canwest.
Therefore, throughout the sample period, Vancouver was the only multi-
newspaper city with just one newspaper owner.
Ontario: Ottawa has three newspapers, of which Southam/Hollinger
and Sun Media initially owned one each. These were acquired by Can-
west and Quebecor respectively. The third, Le Droit, was first acquired by
Hollinger and then sold to Power Corp in 2000. In Toronto, the traditional
rivalry between the Sun and the Star came under the spotlight in 1998
with the Star ’s parent company, Torstar, attempting a hostile takeover of
the Toronto Sun’s parent company, Sun Media. However, eventually Que-
becor outbid Torstar to complete its purchase of Sun Media’s newspapers.
Toronto’s other daily, the Globe and Mail, at the time Canada’s only truly
national newspaper, was long owned by the Thomson group, but was ac-
quired by BCE in 2001.
Manitoba: Winnipeg’s two newspapers were long owned by Quebecor
and Thomson respectively, until Thomson sold the Winnipeg Free Press, in
2001, to an independent corporation.
Nova Scotia: One of Halifax’s two newspapers remained independently
owned throughout our study period. The other, The Daily News, was pur-
chased by Southam/Hollinger during the 1996 merger wave, and then by
Canwest during the 2000 mergers.
These 9 cities account for 22 daily newspapers. These are the only news-
papers for which the mergers had an appreciable effect on the herfindahl in-
dices defined earlier; the other newspapers did see changes in the weighted
herfindahl measures due to variation in their own circulation, but not di-
One of these papers, Le Devoir, has a relatively low daily circulation of about 35,000 and
has lost money during most of its existence.
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Others Multi-Newspaper Diff-in-Diff
Cities
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.15 0.1 0.13 0.16 -0.02 0.04
Weekday Circ. -3473 4871 -11295 26645 -7822 5707
Ad rate -0.09 0.48 0.35 1.86 0.44 0.40
Av Pages -1.21 7.4 3.79 10.83 5.00 2.45
Ad rate per 10K 0.07 0.41 0.18 0.86 0.11 0.19
Log Weekday Circ. -0.16 0.14 -0.15 0.49 0.01 0.11
N 79 22
Table 11: Difference in Differences estimates for Newspapers located in
multi-newspaper cities
rectly as a result of the mergers since they did not face direct competition.
Therefore, we examine these 22 newspapers which faced significant local
competition against the other newspapers with respect to changes in circu-
lation and prices, and compare the changes to the remaining papers. The
results are presented in Table 11.
The results do not support the notion that newspapers in these cities
had significantly different price and quantity changes from newspapers in
other cities. This is also consistent with the results of Section 4.1. It does
appear that newspapers in multi-newspaper cities increased their average
number of pages relative to the remaining newspapers, and this change was
significant.
4.3 The Globe and Mail
In this section we analyze whether the Globe and Mail (henceforth G&M )
was affected by the mergers of the late 1990s. The reason for the special
emphasis on this newspaper is that the G&M was at the time, and continues
to be, Canada’s most influential daily newspaper. It is considered to be the
newspaper of record, and indeed bills itself as ‘Canada’s National Paper’.
It is also Canada’s second largest daily, but the only paper with a truly
24
1995 1999
Globe and Mail
Ontario: 195354 210173
Eastern 27,261 29,915
Central 148,901 162,494
Southwestern 12,669 12,115
Northern 5,236 4,635
Northwestern 1,287 1,014
British Columbia 35401 36877
Quebec 17444 18479
Balance in Country 53692 56097
Total 301891 321626
National Post - 325000
Aggregate Circulation 5.01 M 5.07 M
Table 12: Globe and Mail circulation by province
national reach; the largest newspaper, the Toronto Star, has most of its
circulation concentrated within Ontario. Another reason to consider the
G&M independently is that we do not have county level circulation data
for this newspaper over our study period. Circulation data for the G&M is
collected only at the Census Agglomeration (CA) or Census Metropolitan
Area (CMA) level. These are urban geographic categories defined by the
Canadian census. We obtained circulation data at the CMA and CA levels
directly from the G&M.
The G&M had long been the flagship paper of the Thomson group. It
was retained in the 1990s despite the sale of most of Thomson’s newspapers;
however it was finally sold in 2001 to BCE Inc. In 1998, Conrad Black
created the conservative leaning National Post as an alternative to the G&M
as a national paper. In Table 12 we provide figures detailing the circulation
of the G&M in 1995 and 1999. For comparison purposes, we also provide the
aggregate circulation of the National Post (which did not exist in 1995) and
the total daily circulation of all newspapers in Canada in these years. The
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G&M ’s circulation in various provinces was computed by summing CMA
level data across each province.
¿From the table it appears that, despite the creation of the National Post,
the G&M ’s circulation was not affected during our study period. In fact, it
increased by about 20,000 daily copies over the 4-year period. The paper also
increased its share of the national daily newspaper market. Its circulation
across most of the country was remarkably stable. Within Ontario, the
G&M more or less maintained its circulation throughout the province, with
the exception of Central Ontario (which includes the Toronto Metropolitan
Area), where its circulation increased by almost 10%.
To summarize, there is no reason to believe that the G&M was affected
by the creation of the National Post. Moreover, the fact that we do not have
county level circulation data for the G&M does not appear to be a cause
for concern, given the stability of its circulation within each province over
the period of study.
5 Policy Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed some of the consequences of the wave of
mergers and ownership changes that took place in the Canadian newspa-
per industry in the mid 1990s. Our goal was to focus on the economic
effects that are easily quantifiable—the effect on circulation and advertising
prices—rather than on the subjective issue of diversity in media opinions.
We use data from immediately before and after the mergers, as well as more
recent data, to infer whether changes in the competitive environment led to
observable effects on prices and circulation.
The answer appears to unambiguously be that the ownership changes did
not lead to higher prices for consumers. There does not appear to have been
a collusive effect of the mergers, or an exploitation of concentration to raise
prices by chains with market power. Indeed, acquired papers, and those that
were part of the dominant chains, saw smaller price rises or greater price de-
clines than other papers. Interestingly, there is only weak evidence that the
mergers impacted circulation; it may have been expected that new ownership
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could have an initial adverse effect on circulation, through editorial changes
or other policies which could alienate existing readers. Our findings hold
true throughout the period of study, whether we examine price changes im-
mediately following mergers, or after a 3 year gap. When we examine more
detailed, county level data, there is some support for the hypothesis that ad-
vertising rates rose for newspapers in more concentrated markets following
the mergers, though there appears to be no effect of the mergers on circu-
lation prices. Overall we vindicate the Competition Bureau’s decision to
permit these mergers since we find that they left the welfare of both readers
and advertisers unaffected. Given these results, critics of newsprint consol-
idation need to prove that diversity in the Canadian press was adversely
affected by these mergers.
We now discuss some explanations for our results:
1. Competition from other media: One possible explanation for our re-
sults is that newspapers do not necessarily constitute an industry by
themselves, but are part of a wider media market that also includes
radio and television stations and other print media such as magazines.
If consumers view these various sources of news and information as
reasonably close substitutes for each other, then consolidation in news-
paper markets does not imply an ability by publishers to set higher
prices. This story implies that relaxing cross-ownership restrictions
across different media, as proposed in the United States should cause
concern in circulation markets.
2. Newspapers maximize joint profits in advertising markets: A second
explanation focuses on advertising prices and takes almost the ex-
treme opposite view of competition in newspaper markets. To the
extent that newspaper subscribers are mutually exclusive (i.e. to the
extent that households or individuals purchase a single newspaper and
circulations do not overlap), publishers can be viewed as monopolists
in advertising markets. The value to a potential advertiser of plac-
ing an advertisement in a newspaper is a function of the characteris-
tics of the subscription base. As discussed in Chandra (2006), if this
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value exceeds the advertising price, then the advertisement should be
placed, regardless of prices at other newspapers.25 Therefore, each
publisher sets advertising prices ignoring prices at other papers (even
other papers in the same group). This implies that, regardless of the
ownership structure, publishers maximize joint profits in advertising
markets, which explains why prices do not rise despite considerable
consolidation. 26
3. Attempts by the newspaper chains to ‘lie low’: Given the scale of the
consolidation in the Canadian newspaper industry, and the accompa-
nying debate over the effects of consolidation, newspaper chains may
have chosen not to exercise their market power by raising prices, so
as to avoid outrage or further scrutiny of the mergers. It would also
not be surprising if the Canadian Competition Bureau had imposed
ex-ante or ex-post conditions on the merger: requiring, for example,
that prices not be raised in either circulation or advertising markets
after the mergers. 27 We contacted the Competition Bureau to en-
quire about this possibility, but we could not get confirmation on this
point.
A broader question is relevant regarding the goals of newspaper publish-
ers: Do they maximize profits in the sense of traditional firms or are there
other goals that they pursue? A common motive attributed to newspaper
moguls is that they have ideological rather than financial reasons to pursue
and maintain market shares in their markets. Some media ventures lose
money consistently. These are sometimes supported by public financing;
at other times they are operated by individuals or firms for whom the loss
25This result holds exactly only if the firm’s marginal costs are constant. If marginal
costs are increasing then the ad rate at other papers may enter into the decision to place
an ad by changing the total number of clients served by the firm.
26It is worth pointing out the possibility that advertising prices are not considered
as important as circulation prices by regulatory authorities. This may be because the
interests of newspaper readers receive considerably more scrutiny than those of advertising
customers, both by politicians and the media. Because the customers of advertising are
firms and businesses, there may be less public concern following a rise in advertising prices.
27The Competition Bureau imposed these types of controls on ticket prices following
the merger between Air Canada and Canadian.
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in revenues is trivial compared to the prestige and influence afforded by a
large circulation base. A good example is the New York Post, owned by
Rupert Murdoch, which is estimated to be losing millions of dollars every
year. Conrad Black, who was instrumental in most of Canada’s newspaper
takeovers, was widely alleged to have the goal of making his newspapers
project a conservative outlook. In such cases, it may not be surprising that
greater market power does not lead to higher prices for consumers since
profitability may not have been the original rationale for the mergers in the
first place.
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